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IN THE SUPREM.E CO,URT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK BILL TOM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 10241 
DAYS OF '47 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STAT·EMEN·T OF KIND O·F CAS·E 
'This is an action by plaintiff to recover damages for 
personal injuries sustained by him in an accident at the 
Utah State Fair Grounds in July, 19·62, when he fell from 
the bleachers while watching a rodeo sponsored by de-
fendant, Days of '47. 
The jury returned a special verdict in plaintiff's 
favor in the arnount of $18,548.80, and judgment was en-
tered thereon against defendant and appellant. 
RELIEF SO·UGHT ON APPE·AL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgn1ent below 
and entry of judgment in its favor and against plaintiff, 
no cause of action, or, that failing, a new trial. 
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2 
Plaintiff commenced this action against defendant 
and ~ppellant Days of '47, Inc., Utah State F-air Asso-
ciation, and Hutchinson-Mills Rodeo. (R. 1-3). The ac-
tion as against the State Fair Association was dismissed 
on its motion under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Hutchinson-Mills was never served, and never appeared. 
The action was tried as against this appealing defendant 
only. 
Plaintiff, with members of his family, came to the 
Utah State Fair Grounds to attend a performance of the 
Days of '47 Rodeo in July, of 196·2. (R. 1, 4). The date 
was generally agreed to be July 21st, (R. 184), although 
plaintiff and members of his family persisted in fixing it 
at July 7th, and the complaint so alleged. (R. 1). Admit-
tedly, plaintiff and members of his family did not pur-
chas·e admission tickets. (R. 106, 193). According to 
plaintiff's testimony, he intended to compete in the rodeo 
as a bronco rider, but he arrived late and there were no 
mounts left for him. (R. 193). However, he and members 
of his family were granted free admission to the rodeo. 
( R. 106, 193). They sat in the bleachers. ( R. 82, 105, 17 6, 
Ex. 2). However, they did not all sit together. ·Plaintiff 
and his two sons sat on the top row, or near the top of the 
bleacheTs. (R. 82, 105, 176.) Plaintiff's wife and daugh-
ters sat two or three rows in front of him. (R. 82, 1051 
176, Eoc. 2.) 
A Brahma bull charged the fence encircling the 
arena and broke over it or through it and onto the track 
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in front of the grandstand. (R. 87, 88, 133, 2!65, 276., 282.) 
In the ensuing confusion, plaintiff in some manner fell 
from the bleachers to the ground underneath, s11staining 
an injury to his head, and other lesser injuries. Plaintiff 
testified that the bull attempted to come up into the 
bleachers, and that he moved forward to meet him, hop-
ing thereby to protect his family from injury. (R. 18?-
187, 195, 196, 197, 198.) He "tried to grab the rope" (R.· 
186) which was hanging on the bull, hoping to fasten it 
to something, and thus detain the bull so that his family 
could escape. (R. 186, 196, 198.) His last memory was 
of moving forward to me·et the bull and grabbing the 
rope. (R. 187, 198.) He believed that he was thrown by 
the bull over the grandstand. (R. 186, 1916.) 
No other witness who testified s~w how the plain-
tiff got from the grandstand to the ground. His two 
sons, who were with him, jumped from the top· of the 
grandstand to the ground and ran away. (R. 87-89.) They 
did not see their father again until they returned and 
found him lying unconscious on the ground. (R. 90~91, 
107, 109.) They did not know how he fell from the grand-
stand. (R. 107.) Plaintiff's wife and two daughters also 
jumped from the grandstand, but did not see how plain-
tiff fell from the grandstand to the ground. ( R. 178, 180, 
181.) No other witness produced by either party claiined 
to have any knowledge concerning the plaintiff's fall. 
(R. 145, 265-266, 282.) However, Woolas Macey, a wit-
ness called by plaintiff, testified that the· bull did not 
enter the ·grandstand, and there was no surging or 
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scrambling backward by the crowd. ( R. 1 ±5). Officer 
Lester Rich also testified that the bull did not enter the 
grandstand. ( R,. 27 4.) 
. A fence expert produced by the plaintiff who did not 
examine the fence at the time of the accident, but nearly 
two years afterward, testified that the fence at the Fair 
Grounds arena was inadequate for rodeo purposes~ (R. 
160). In particular, he testified that the fencing (chain-
link) should have been on the inside rather than the out-
side of the fence posts ( R. 161) ; that the wire holding 
the fencing to the posts was inadequate (R. 160) ; that it 
should have been a great deal higher; that there should 
have been a tension wire on the bottom of the fence; and 
also that there should have been a different type of "eye" 
tops on the fence posts. (R,. 158.) His testimony was re-
butted by witnesses called by defendant, (R. 270), who 
testified that the fence was a "'way above average rodeo 
fence," and in their opinion was reasonably adequate for 
rodeo purposes. (R. 272, 290.) Moreover, there was 
substantial testimony that when the bull escaped, the 
fence yielded because the posts bent over, permitting the 
entire fence to he knocked down, rather than because o~ 
any separation of the fencing from the posts. (R. 265, 
283.) In short, the defects to \vhich plaintiff's expert 
testified (even if conceded as defects) did not permit the 
bull to escape. The part of the fence which yielded 
was the posts supporting it, and no witness, expert or 
otherwise, testified that they "\vere inadequate posts, or 
that they were not adequately emplaced or secured. 
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Plaintiff claimed, by way of damages, a head injury 
resulting in dizziness, headaches and . impairment of 
1nernory, iinpairinent of hearing in his right ear, and 
other lesser injuries which healed uneventfully. (R. 221) . 
... t\.dmittedly plaintiff had sustained many injuries prior to 
the accident including the loss of an eye in a mine acci .. 
dent (R. 78, 203); a skull fracture during childhood (R .. 
203, 214) ; fracture of the left elbow ( R. 203, 204) ; frac-
ture of the left tibia ( R. 203) ; wound of the left upper 
arm (R. 204), and an old injury to the right knee. (R. 
210.) He also sustained at least two injuries after his 
accident at the rodeo, and before the time of trial, which 
will be more particularly noted hereafter. 
He was attended immediately after the accident by 
Dr. Stewart Wright, a neuro- surgeon .. (R .. 201.) He was 
confined in St. ~iark's Hospital for approximately 17 
days following the accident, on a program of bed rest 
and prophylactic treatment to prevent infection, and 
particularly meningitis. (R. 207, 221.) Plaintiff made 
normal progress during his hospitalization (R. 207-8), 
and after he was discharged on August 7th, was not seen 
again by Dr. Wright until November 5, 1963. (R. 208.) 
Up to this time Dr. Wright had detected no evidence of 
impaired cerebration or Inemory. (R. 208.) At that thne 
he had no coinplaints of headaches, but he did complain 
of periodic dizziness and intpaired hearing in the right 
ear. (R. 208.) At that tiine he had a laceration and abra-
sion between the eye-brows and he related that he had 
been struck by a bottle a few days before. (R .. 209, 223.) 
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-Dr. Wright next and last saw him before trial on 
May 22, 1964. (R. 210.) At that time there was still no 
complaint of headaches ( R. 210, 225), but plaintiff corn-
plained that he was still weak. He was, however, using 
crutches because of an old knee injury, and he also re-
lated that he had been hospitalized by another blow on 
the head received in J-anuary of 1964. This was identi-
fied by other witnesses as a blow from a car jack. (R. 
116.) The period of hospitalization was not determined, 
but the blow was sufficient to render plaintiff uncon-
scious, and he was dizzy for a month afterward. (R. 210, 
226.) On this visit he complained for the first time of im-
pairment of memory. (R. 213, 225.) 
Dr. Wright did not undertake to estimate the extent 
or percentage of disability sustained by the plaintiff as 
a result of the rodeo accident. (R. 213.) He admitted, on 
cross-examination, that the impairment in hearing could 
have resulted from the skull fracture which was sustain-
ed in childhood. (R. 214.) He admitted that linear skull 
fractures of the type sustained by plantiff normally heal 
(R~ 218), and that there was no indication of intra-
cranial abnormality in plaintiff. (R. 218.) He also ad-
mitted, somewhat reluctantly, and after being pressed, 
that being hit in the head \vith a bottle could account for 
plaintiff's headaches and dizziness. (R. 223.) With equal 
reluctance he admitted that the claimed impairment of 
memory could have resulted from the blow of January 
1, 19·64. (R .. 226.) A Hoffn1an sign, never noted before 
the May exarnination, also could have resulted from the 
latter accident. (R. 228.) 
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. Dr. vVhitney .Haight, an otolaryngologist, testified 
that he examined the plaintiff on May 22, 1964. (R. 2.32.) 
Upon this examination he found a diminution of hearing 
in the right ear (the injured ear) in the amount of 30 
percent; and loss of hearing in the left ear (the uninjured 
ear) of 50 percent. ( R. 232, 233.) He stated that he was 
unable to state the cause of the hearing loss. ( R. 233.) 
In response to a direct question by the court, he stated 
that he couldn't tell whether the impairment was due to 
trauma, disease or congenital causes. (R. 233.) Defend-
ant therefore moved to strike his testimony, which mo-
tion was at first granted, but later over-ruled, apparently 
on the basis of some earlier testimony by plaintiff and 
his son that he had no impairment of hearing prior to 
the accident. (R. 233-234.) 
On cross-examination Dr. Haight testified that the 
hearing impairment was due to some injury, damage or 
deterioration of the auditory nerve; that it would be 
impossible to determine the cause of it. (R. 235.) On 
re-direct he testified that it would be impossible to de-
termine whether the disability was from injury, degenera-
tion, aging or toxic materials. (R. 236.) Although a frac-
ture sufficien~ to cause loss of blood and spinal fluid 
would probably cause some hearing loss (R. 237), he ad-
mitted on re-cross examination that bleeding and loss 
of spinal fluid could not account for thP loss of hearing 
in the left ~ar, which was greater than the loss of hearing 
in the injured ear .. :(R. 237.) He further admitted that 
there was no way of determining which of plaintiff's sev-
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eral accidents caused the loss of hearing, even if it was of 
traumatic origin. ( R. 238.) 
Plaintiff and his fa1nily normally contracted to work 
in the sugar beet fields during the summer months. (R. 
76-77, 9'4.) They would start working about May 20th 
and return to their home on the reservation around Aug-
ust 1st, so that the children could resume their schooling. 
(R. 77.) At the time of the accident plaintiff and his 
family were working for a farmer in Centerfield. (R. 93-
94.) After plaintiff's injury his family completed the 
contract, (R. 93, 113), and after plaintiff's discharge 
from the hospital, the family returned to their home 
on the reservation in accordance with their usual custom. 
There was no evidence whatsoever as to what proportion 
of the work of the family unit was normally done by the 
plaintiff. There was no evidence that either he or his 
family lost any income from their regular occupations 
during the summer of 1962. There was no evidence that 
plaintiff lost any income fron1 any employment that he 
might reasonably have anticipated during the winter of 
1962-63. Plaintiff and his family went to work in the beet 
fields near Blackfoot, Idaho, in the summer of 1963 at 
the usual time. (R. 101-102, 190, 240.) Plaintiff was able 
to work with his family. (R. 240.) There -is no evidence 
that they did not get their usual contract rate, or that 
plaintiff did not perform his usual proportion of the total 
work performed by the family. In short, there is no evi-
dence whatsoever that plaintiff or his family sustained 
any loss of income or earning capacity whatsoever as a 
result of the accident. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
The case was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories. (R. 38, 53-56.) By its answer to interrogatory 
~1, the jury found that plaintiff fell from the bleachers 
because of the movement of the crowd. (R. 5·3.) There 
\vas absolutely no evidence whatsoever that a:r;1y move-
nlent of the crowd caused or contributed to cause the 
plaintiff to fall. 
The jury also found that plaintiff did not fall while 
attempting to contain the bull. ( R. 54.) Plaintiff testified 
that he was attempting to grab the rope on the bull when 
he fell. (R. 186, 19·5-196, 197.) This was the only explana-
tion offered by any witness as to how the accident occur-
red. Clearly the jury did not accept this explanation. 
The jury further found that defendant was guilty of 
negligence, which was a proximate cause of the accident 
(R. 55) and assessed plaintiff's damages at $18,548.80 
(R. 56). Plaintiff's special damages for ~edical care, 
in the amount of $548.80, were undisputed. Therefore, 
$18,000 of the verdict must be allocated to general dam-
ages. 
Before submission of the case to the jury, defendant 
moved for a directed verdict, which motion was sum-
marily denied. (R. 29·3.) After entry of the judgment on 
the verdict, (R. 57), defendant duly filed its motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial 
(R. 61.) This motion was denied after argurnent (R. 62.)., 
and this appeal followed. (R. 63.) 
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ARGUMEN·T 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S SPECIAL FINDING #1. 
T·he initial question presented to the jury by the 
special verdict was to determine the cause;·· or causes of 
plaintiff's fall. The first choice suggested was that the 
surging of the crowd backward caused the fall. The jury 
answered this in the affirmative. 
As we have heretofore noted in our statement of 
facts, there was no testimony from any witness to the 
accident that any movement of the crowd in any way 
caused, or contributed to cause, the plaintiff's fall from 
the bleachers. The only testimony whatsoever, as to the 
cause of plaintiff's fall, was his own testimony, which 
was to the effect that he attempted to control the bull 
by moving forward and grasping one of the ropes hang-
ing on it, as a resut of which he was thrown from the 
bleachers. ·The jury's finding #1, the ref ore, rests on pure 
conjecture and speculation, and cannot be permitted to 
stand. 
By its special finding #2, the jury specifically re-
jected plaintiff's version of the accident. Thus the only 
evidence as to how the accident was caused, failed to per-
suade the jury. However, the finding of causation upon 
which plaintiff's judgment rests, was and is without 
evidentiary support and is therefore fatally defective. 
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It is elementary that a verdict unsupported by evi-
dence 'vill not be permitted to stand. See 39 Am. J ur., 
145-146, New Trial §128: 
BA special verdict will be set aside where it 
is shown to be contrary to the evidence in the 
case or to be unsustained by the evidence." 
To the srune effect see 53 An1. J ur., 755-6, Trial 
§ 1089: 
"In the absence of evidence to support a ma-
terial finding, it may be set aside or stricken from 
the record, and in the discretion of the court judg-
ment may be entered in accordance with the un-
disputed evidence in the case, or the verdict may 
be set aside entirely and a new trial granted." 
This particular finding of fact is essential to plain-
tiff's cause of action. It is fundamental that plaintiff 
must not only prove negligence, but also that such negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the accident and loss. 
See 4 Am. J ur., 2d 217, Amusements and Exhibitions §94: 
"As in other negligence cases, in order to 
hold liable, for personal injuries or death, an 
owner or operator of a place of public arnusement 
or of an amusement device, on the basis of negli-
gence, not only must his negligence be establish-
ed but it must also be established that such negli-
gence was a direct and proximate cause of the in-
jury or death for which recovery is sought. ***" 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION #12 WAS TANTAMOUNT 
TO A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF NEGLI-· 
GENCE, AND WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
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The court's instruction #12 reads as follows: 
"You are further instructed that the defend-
ant was under a duty to see ·that the fende was 
safe for the use for which it w1as intended, viz., 
to keep the bull out of the bleachers and in the 
arena; and in that connection you are instructed 
that it had a duty to so construct the fence so that 
it would serve the purposes for which it was in-
tended and to use reasonable diligence commen-
surate with the risk involved to inspect it from 
time to time and see that it was kept in a proper 
condition to keep the animals in the arena; and if 
the defendant failed in either of these duties, it 
would be negligent." (Emphasis ours.) 
It will be noted that by this instruction . the court 
placed upon the defendant the burden of an absolute in-
surer, or guarantor, that the fence, as constructed, was 
absolutely safe or "bull proof," plus the further duty of 
exercising reasonable care to see that it was maintained 
in that condition. Assuming that plaintiff was in the 
status of an invitee (which we deny) defendant's only 
duty toward him would be to exercise rea.sonable care 
under the circumstances, to see that the fence was reason-
ably safe for the use for which it was intended. 
While the court correctly instructed the jury that 
the duty in connection with inspection was to use ''reason-
able diligence commensurate with the risk involved," it 
placed the defendant under an absolute duty "to see that 
the fence was safe for the use for which it was intended, 
viz. : to keep the bull out of the bleachers and. in the 
arena." The delineating of two separate dutjes was obvi-
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ously done advisedly. The court concluded the instruc-
tion by saying that if the defendant failed in "either" 
of these duties, it was negligent. 
Since the bull admittedly escaped through 
or over the fence, there was under the court's instruc-
tion a clear violation of one of the duties therein set forth. 
Thus the instruction is tantamount to advising the jury 
that as a matter of law defendant was negligent in failing 
to furnish a Hbull proof" fence. This disregards en-
tirely the testimony of defendant's witnesses as to the 
quacy of the fence, and flies into the teeth of the law. 
The general principles governing the operation of 
an amusement or exhibition for public entertainment are 
set forth in 4 Am. Jur. 2d under the title Amusements 
and Exhibitions as follows : 
Page 168: 
"§ 52. While the proprietor or operator of a 
place of public amusement or entertainment is 
held to a sl!'icter accountability for injuries to 
patrons than owners of private premises general-
ly, the rule is that he is not an ins:urer of their 
safety. * * * The proprietor or operator of a 
place or facility of public amusement or enter-
tainment is bound to exercise only 'orqjnary' or 
're~ble' care for the safety and protection 
of his patrons-that is, the care which an ordin-
arily prudent person, rather than the care which 
a cautious man of more than average prudence, 
would have exercised under the same or similar 
circumstances." 
Page 197: 
"§ 74. Those who conduct horse shows, dog 
shows, and other domestic animal exhibitions 1nust 
exercise reasonable care to proctect spectators or 
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·exhibitors from harm from anmials on exhibition 
' and this is true even through the animal exhibited 
has no known vicious propensity. * * *" 
P'age 198: 
·"§ 75. The exhibition of wild animals is 
judicially recognized as lawful, whether the exhi-
bition is carried on as a business or in connection 
with and as an attraction to some other business. 
The exhibitor is, however, held to a v.~ 
de~e to see that his premises are safe 
and to give warning of dangers of which he knows, 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, the basis of liability being 'neglvgence in 
...; restraining the animal .. " (Emphasis ours.) 
A case specifically applying these principles to the 
operator of a rodeo is Zuniga v. Storey, (Tex. 'Civ. App.) 
239 SW2d 125. In that case, a Brahma hull escaped 
from its pen in the rodeo, and ultimately attacked plain-
tiff in his own yard. In holding that the issue of defend-
ant's negligence was for the jury the court said: 
"While operators of rodeos ... are not liable 
as insurers, they are obligated to use reasonable 
care in keeping their show animals securely pen-
ned and housed so they will not get loose upon 
the public street .... " 
S·ee also Va.ughn v. Miller Bros. "10'1" Ranch Wild 
West Show, 109 W. Va. 170, 153 SE 289·, where the court 
said: 
'·'In this country the right to exhibit wild 
animals is judicially recognized. 'The conducting 
of shows for the exhibition of wild ... animals 
is a lawful business.' . . . The idea is no longer 
indulged that it is prima facie negligence-to keep 
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Inodern actions against exhibitors cannot be the 
mere keeping of savage animals, but must be 
neglect to restrain them." 
In Haberlin v. Peninsula Celebration Assn., (Cal. 
App.), 319 P.2d 418, plaintiff was injured by a horse 
which came off the race track out of control during a 
rodeo celebration. Said the Court: 
"
1The evidence in this case fails to establish 
negligence of defendant as a matter of law. As 
questions of fact the evidence would have justi-
fied a finding that defendant was not negligent or 
a finding that plaintiff assumed the risk of danger 
from horses in the restricted area or a finding 
that if defendant was negligent plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence. * * *" 
An instruction based upon the principles enunciated 
by the foregoing authorities was requested by defendant 
( #5) as follows : 
"You are instructed that the owner or oper-
ator of a place of business is not an insurer of the 
safety of his patrons. His only duty is to exercise 
reasonable care to make the premises reasonably 
safe for persons invited to come there, commen-
surate with the purposes for which the place of 
business is maintained." (R. 17). 
The trial judge apparently took the view that the 
keeping and showing of rodeo stock brought defendant 
within the principles of absolute liability for harboring 
wild beasts. However, as shown by the authorities above '--
set forth, that doctrine is now passe, if in fact it ever 
really e!Xisted, and in any event has not been applied to 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
rodeo stock. Moreover, as observed by this court in the 
recent case of Robison v. Robison, ______ Ut. 2d ______ , 39± P. 
2d 876, 877: 
"* * * It is to be observed that even where 
the circumstances justify its application, this so-
called rule of absolute liability has the weakness 
of most generalities. ·There are almost always 
exceptions which prove them fallacious. A. com-
monly used example is the application of the rule 
to the keeping of a wild animal, such as a chained 
bear. But if the person .i.njured has deliberately 
teased the animal, or been so reckless of his safety 
as to practically invite injury, he cannot recover. 
It will thus be seen that the so-called rule of 'abso-
lute liability' is not absolute at all. B~th the pro-
priety of its application in the first instance, and 
any defenses against it,. are conditioned by the 
limitations imposed by the fundamental standard 
which pervades all tort law; the conduct of the 
reasonable prudent man under the circumstances; 
and its procedura-l coroll~ry., that whenever there 
is disp,ute in the evidence, or uncertainty therein, 
as to whether that standard is met, the question 
is for the jury to determine." 
POINT. III. 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE WEIGHTED IN 
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY, AND DEFEND-
ANT'S THEORY OF DEFENSE WAS NOT SUBMITTED TO 
THE JURY. 
POIN'T IV. 
T'HE CO,URT'S INS'TRUCTION #13 WAS A ~COMMENT ON 
THE EVIDENiCE, AND UNFAIRLY EMPHAJSIZED PLAIN-
TTFF'S 'T,HE'ORY OF RE1COV:ERY . 
. . We argue the two foregoing points together, since 
they involve basically the same problems. We have here-
tofore noted the language of the court's instruction #12.· 
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the court's instruction #13 read as follows : 
"Evidence has been introduced in this case 
indicating that at the time of the accident the 
fence through which the Brahma bull charged 
had been constructed with the chain link wire on 
the grandstand side of the posts rather than on 
· the arena side and that the fence was without a 
rail or tension wire or other obstruction between 
the ground and the bottom of the fence. It is for 
you to determine if these matters constituted neg-
ligence in the construction and maintenance of the 
fence on the part of the defendant, and you should 
also consider the type of fastening which was used 
in holding the fence to the posts and the top rail-
ing; and if from all of the matters given in evi-
dence before you in connection with this fence 
you can say by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant did not act as a reasonably pru-
dent person would have acted under the same or 
similar circumstances, then the defendant would 
be negligent; but if in connection with these mat-
ters as you find them to be you believe the defend-
ant acted as a reasonably prudent person would 
have acted under the same or similar circum-
stances; or if you have a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not it so acted, then you cannot find 
that there was negligence." 
By this instruction the court comrnented improperly 
and fully upon the plaintiff's theory of the case. It men-
tioned, item by item, various alleged defects in the fence, 
as testified by plaintiff's witness McLaughlin. While the 
instruction reviewed the evidence relied upon by plain-
tiff to prove negligence in the construction of the fence, 
it ignored completely defendant's theory that it was "a 
way above average" rodeo fence; and reasonably suited 
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for the purposes intended, as testified by the witnesses 
Rudd and Whitesides. 
The instruction #13 also had the vice of unduly em-
phasizing plaintiff's theory of the case. By the court's 
instruction #12 the jury had already been advised that 
defendant had a duty of furnishing a "bull proof" fence. 
It could serve no useful purpose to point out to the jury 
all of the possible defects which might make the fence 
"non-bull proof." 
The absence of any instruction setting forth any 
theory of defense and the repetition of instructions set-
ting forth the plaintiff's theory of recovery also brings 
the case within the rule of the recent case of Taylor v. 
Johnson, ______ Utah 2d ------, 393 P.2d 382, 388 where this 
court said: 
~'We conclude that under the circumstances 
disclosed in the record the instructions were mis-
leading to the jury ; . . . they were repetitious and 
. . . were premised on factual situations which 
.were not supported by the evidence. In view of 
the whole situation the court committed judicial 
error in emphasizing its instructions as it did in 
favor of the [plaintiff] and against the [defend-
ant], and that therefore the [defendant] is end 
titled to a new trial." 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN WITHDRAWING FROM THE 
CONSIDERATION OF THE JURY THE QUESTION OF 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A BUSINESS GUEST OR BARE 
LICENSEE, AND IN FAILING TO ADVISE THE JURY OF 
THE DIFFERENCE IN THE LEGAL DUTY OWED A BUSI-
NESS GUEST., AND TO A LICENSEE. 
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By defendant's requests #6 and 7, it requested the 
court to instruct the jury on the differences ,in the status 
of licensees and invitees, and the differences in the duties 
owed to them, as heretofore defined by this court, and 
as set forth in the Restatement of the Law of Torts. R~e­
quest #6 was as follows: 
"'A business visitor or invitee, is one who 
goes upon the premises of another by express or 
implied invitation of the owner or occupant, and 
in connection with the occupan'ts business, or 
some mutual business with the occupant. 
"A licensee is one who goes upon the land 
or premises of another by the express or implied 
permission of the other. By implied permission 
is meant such permission as may be re:asonably 
inferred from the words or acts of the possessor 
of land, although not expressly authorized. 
"In order for you to determine the relative 
rights and duties between· the defendant and the 
plaintiff, it will be necessary for you first to de-
termine whether said plaintiff, at the time and 
place of the accident, was an invitee or a licensee." 
(R. 16.) 
This is essentially a composite of J.I.F.U. Instruc-
tions 43.1, and 44.1. 
Request #7 was as follows: 
"A licensor, (that is a land owner or occu-
pier), has no duty to prepare the way, or to make 
it safe for a licensee. He has no obligation to 
. change the method in which he conducts his busi-
ness or activities so as to rnake it more safe for 
the licensee. A licensee assumes the risk of any · 
conditions which he rnay encounter· on the licen-
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sor's premises, and he has the duty to look out for 
himself. 
"If you find from the eviqence in this case 
that plaintiff came into defendant's place of busi-
ness only for his own purposes and pleasure, with-
out paying an admission fee, and not to serve any 
interest or advantage of the defendant, then said 
plaintiff was, at best, only a licensee. Under those 
circumstances, defendant would have no duty to 
take any steps to make the premises safe for plain-
tiff. The only duty to plaintiff under such circum-
stances would be to warn him of dangers of which 
defendant had actual knowledge and plaintiff had 
no knowledge ; or dangers which plaintiff would 
not realize involved an unreasonable risk of bod-
ily harm to himself; and to avoid wilfully injuring 
him. 
"If you find from the evidence in this case, 
that plaintiff was a licensee, and that the danger 
of accident of the type which occurred was un-
known to defendant, or as well known to plaintiff, 
as to defendant; and that defendant did not wil-
fully injure said plaintiff, then your verdict should 
be in favor of defendant and against the plaintiff, 
no cause of action." 
This request was based essentially on the rules set 
forth in the following texts: 
A.L.I. Restatement of the Law of Torts, § -341, com-
ment a: 
"The licensee is not entitled to enter the land 
of another except in so far as he is privileged to 
do so by the possessor's consent. Therefore, the 
· mere fact that the possessor has consented to his 
entry gives hin1 no right to expect that the pos-
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sessor will change the Inethod in which he con-
ducts his activity so as to secure the licensee's 
safety. If he knows of the nature of the activities 
conducted upon the land and the manner in which 
they are conducted, he has all that he is entitled 
to expect, that is an opportunity for an intelli-
gent choice as to whether or not the advantage to 
be gained by coming on the land is sufficient to 
justify him in incurring the risks incident there-
to." 
Restatement of Torts, ~ .342.: 
"A possessor of land is subject. to liability for 
bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a 
natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only 
if, he 
"a) knows of the condition and realizes that 
it involves an unrea.sonable risk to them and has 
reason to believe that they will not discover the 
condition or realize the risk, and 
"b) invites or permits them to enter or re-
main upon the land, without exercising reason-
able care 
" ( i) to make the condition reasonably safe, 
or 
~' (ii) to warn them of the condition and the 
risk involved therein." (E.mphasis ours.) 
There is no evidence in this case that defendant was 
aware that the fence was inadequate to hold the bull, or 
that defendant had any knowledge of any unreasonable 
risk to plaintiff. 
See comment c under ~ 342 : 
"A possessor of land owes to a gratuitous 
licensee no duty to prepare a safe place for the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
licensee's reception or to inspect the land to dis-
cover possible or even probable dangers. 
"If the licensee is gratuitous, the privilege 
to enter is a gift and the licensee, as the recipient 
thereof, is entitled to expect nothing more than a 
disclosure of the conditions which he will meet if 
he acts upon the license and enters, in so far as 
those conditio·ns are known to the giver of the 
privilege." (Emphasis ours.) 
S·ee also comment f thereunder : 
"A possessor of land who permits gratuitous 
licensees to enter thereon, is subject to liability for 
bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous 
state in which he permits a natural or artificial 
condition to remain, if, but only if, he not only 
knows of the condvtiO'n but also realizes it involves 
an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to 
the particular licensee harmed thereby." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
See also Prosser on Torts, 2nd ed., 445. 
The plaintiff, by his own admission, was no better 
than a licensee, since, admittedly, he came into the rodeo 
gr.atuitously, although admission generally was by pay-
ment of an admission fee. He came not to serve ~y pur-
pose of the defendant, but only to satisfy his own inter-
est and curiosity. In view of the complete absence of 
any evidence that defendant had any knowledge of any 
dangerous defect or condition in the fence prior to the 
rodeo, defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruc-
tion under the foregoing rules. At the very least defend-
ant was entitled to have submitted to the jury for deter-
Inination the issue of plaintiff's status on defendant's 
prernises, the defendant's duty to plaintiff, and whether 
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there. \vas :any breach of this duty. The denial of this 
right was prejudicial and reversible error. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF DR. HAIGHT. 
Part of the drunages claimed by plaintiff was impair-
lnent of hearing in the right ear. His own testimony on 
the subject (which was the only foundation laid for the 
testimony of Dr. Haight) was very vague, and was as fol-
lows: 
"Q. Mr. Tom, one matter we want to get clear. 
Before you were down to the fairgrounds at 
the time you were injured-
A. Yes. 
Q. -before that, what was the condition of your 
hearing as far as your right ear is conce-rned~ 
A. Well, it was-I was in pretty good health 
at the time. 
Q. Were you able to hear as far as you could 
observe as well, normally out of right ear~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, have you observed whether or not you 
can hear normally out of your right ear since 
then~ 
A. Not so good. 
Q. Has that been in any way affected by this 
affray in January of 1964, last-just last 
January~ Did that affect your hearing' 
A. No. That was since that first time." (R. 241-
42.) 
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"Q. Mr. Tom, when did you first notice that you 
were having memory problems~ 
A. That is the first time when I was in the hos-
pital when I woke up. I didn't hear nothing 
on this side, and afterwards I kind of get that 
hearing. 
Q. How about the hearing in your left ear, the 
other ear from the right, your left ear~ Do 
you understand what I mean by 'left ear'~. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had you had an impairment or loss of hearing 
in your left ear-
A. No. 
Q. -before this injury with the bull~ 
A. No." (R. 242-43.) 
. "Q. Now, do you notice at this time what the con-
dition of the hearing in your left ear is~ ;Can 
you hear normally in your left ear now? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You can hear normally in your left ear now' 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, so as far as you are able to observe, the 
hearing problem you have is in your right ear. 
Is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, can you answer 'Yes' or 'No'~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mr. Tom, do you observe whether or not this 
hearing in your right ear is getting better or 
worse or remaining the sal_lle ~ 
A. Remained the same." (R. 243.) .-
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No details- were offered as to whether the claimed 
loss of hearing was sudden or gradual, or when it was 
first noticed. No claim of impaired hearing in the left 
ear was made by plaintiff. 
Superi1nposed on the above quoted testimony was 
Dr. Haight's testimony as to the extent of plaintiff's hear-
ing loss in both ears as set forth in our statement of facts. 
However, Dr. Haight frankly and repeatedly admitted 
that he did not know, and that there was no way of deter-
mining _whether the accident of July, 196,2 was either the 
sole or a contributing cause of plaintiff's hearing im-
pairment, or whether it was caused solely by other acci-
dent, or whether it was caused by non-traumatic means. 
No effort was made by plaintiff's attorneys to establish a 
causal relationship between the injury and the accident 
by the use of hypothetical questions or in any other ap-
proved manner. Thus the testimony of DT. Haight, as 
to the extent of plaintiff's hearing loss in both ears, was 
left standing with the jury without any competent evi-
dence whatsoever on which to base a finding that the 
accident here involved was a cause of such loss. The size 
of the jury's verdict strongly suggests that the jury con-
sidered that plaintiff sustain.ed a substantial hearing loss 
as a result of this accident. Such a finding would have to 
rest on pure conjecture and speculation, in which the jury 
is not permitted to indulge. Clearly it was prejudicial 
error to permit the testimony of Dr. Haight to stand. 
This appears to fall within the principles of M oorc 
v. D. & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 4 Ut. 2d, 255, 292 P. 2d 849. 
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probative. The refusal of the court to strike Dr. Haight's 
testimony was erroneous and seriously prejudicial to de-
fendant's case. 
POINT VII. 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES IS EXCESSIVE AND UN-
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It is undisputed that plaintiff sustained a linear skull 
fracture, requiring his hospitalization for a period of 17 
days. His total medical expense for treatment was 
$-548.80. By the testimony of his doctor, the fracture. 
would normally heal uneventfully, and assumedly did. 
There was some vague evidence that the plaintiff may 
have sustained some impairment of memory as a result 
of the accident, although such symptom did not appear 
u11til after he had been involved in two later episodes 
inv~lving injury to his head. No effort was made to 
assess or define the extent of this purported loss. There 
was no. competent medical evidence to connect the claim-
ed.loss of hearing with the rodeo accident. There was no 
evidence whatsoever of any impairment in earnings or 
earning Gapacity. In short, there is no evidence of any 
signi~icant loss to the plaintiff whatsoever, beyond a rela-
tively brief period of temporary disability, and an award 
of.$18,000, general .damages, appears to be based purely 
on sympathy and passion, unsupported by any competent 
evidence. 
Since the decision of thi.s court in J (3nsen_ v. D.~. & R. 
G. W. R., Co., 4-± lTt. 100, 138 P. 1185, it. has been well 
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established in this state that this court will not hesitate 
to set aside an excessive verdict appearing to have been 
given as a result of passion and prejudice and not based 
on the evidence. In that case this court said: 
"Still the jury cannot be permitted to go un-
bridled and unchecked. Hence the 'Code that a new 
trial on motion of the aggrieved party may be 
granted by the court below on the ground of 'ex-
cessive damages appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice.' 
Whenever that is made to appear, the court, when 
its action is properly invoked, should require a 
remission or set the verdict aside and grant a new 
trial.'' 
Also apropos here is the language of this court in 
the case of Duffy v. U.P.R. Co., 118 Ut. 82, 218 P.2d 1080, 
where this court said : 
"We must assume that the jury awarded 
plaintiff the sum of $1,300 for loss of wages, which 
were his only established special damages, and 
this leaves the sum of $11,200 for general damages. 
When we get into this domain reasonable minds 
differ as to what amount is excessive. However, 
there must be a limit beyond which ~ reasonable 
jury cannot go and the limit must be determined 
on the gross amount of the verdict and not the net 
amount. Conceding that jurors in different states 
and counties have different n1onetary standards 
and different ideas as to the value of pain and suf-
fering; that present day costs of living are com-
paratively high; that the purchasing power of the 
dollar has decreased to approximately one~half 
of what it was some ten years ago; that we are 
seemingly in an inflationary spiral; and, that by 
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all reasonable standards verdicts should. be larger 
than they were at that period; we are, neverthe-
less, of the opinion in this case that the damages 
awarded by the jury have no foundation in fact, 
and are so grossly excessive and eocorbitant as to 
convince the members of this Court that the ver-
dict is far in excess of what a reasonable jury 
could determine as the maximum amount award-
able for this type of injury. *** 
''Previously decided cases are of little value 
in fixing present day standards or in assisting 
courts in determining excessive awards. Both the 
court and the jury are required to deal :with many 
. unknown factors and a good guess is about the 
best that can be hoped for. The permissible mini-
mum and maximum limits within which a jury 
may operate for a given injury are presently 
far apart and must continue to be widespread 
so long as pain and suffe-ring must be measured 
by money standards. * * * · 
"In this instance we conclude there was an 
abuse of discretion and that a new trial should 
have been granted or a remittitur requested. ***" 
And in Stamp v. U.P.R. Co., 5 Ut. 2d 397, 303 P.2d 
279, this court said: 
"We are of the opinion that the award made 
by the jury has no basis in fact. Such an award 
is so excessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science and to clearly indicate passion or preju-
dice, and it abundantly appears that there is no 
evidence to support or justify the verdict. The 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
grant a new trial or in ordering a remittitur." 
We are fully mindful of 'vhat this court said in the 
Duffy case concerning the value of precedents on the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29. 
issue of excessive damages. We recognize that so many 
variable factors enter into the determination of damages 
in each case, that the award in any one particular case 
is not of much value as a guide in determining what is 
fair and reasonable in another case. However, for what-
ever assistance they may be to the court, we invite at-
tention to the following cases, wherein the injuries sus-
tained by the plaintiff appear to be of the same nature 
and of a severity equal to or greater than those sustained 
by the plaintiff in the case at bar: 
In Cermak v. Hertz Corp., 5 N.J. S·uper. 455, 147 A2d 
800, the court said: 
"Plaintiffs proved special damages were less 
than $1000. His subjective complaints included 
headaches, pains in his ears and head radiating 
down through his spine and back, deafness, a 
heavy feeling in his eyes, pain in back of his head 
which bothers him constantly, pain in both· shoul-
ders and in the center and sides of neck, sorness 
of the muscles of the neck and the back of ears 
_and pain in the sacroiliac and sciatic nerve which 
radiate across the bottom of his back. Plaintiff 
also testified that at the time of the trial he was 
still suffering from the pains in the head, eyes, 
shoulders, neck muscles, lower back and right leg. 
He testified that his hearing had been affected 
and that he suffered a partial loss thereof. He 
said he still has trouble in moving the head and 
neck and that the neck stiffens up easily if he 
makes any awkward motion which handicaps him 
especially when working and that he has become 
nervous since the accident." 
A judgment in the arnount of $8500 was order<~d re-
duced to $6,000. 
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In Gillogly v. New England 1"'ransp. Co., 73 R.I. 45·6, 
57 A2.d 411, the court said : 
'J 
"It is clear that the plaintiff suffered lJainful 
injuries to the head, face, and chest, but apparent-
ly those responded to treatment within a few 
months; and that she also suffered injuries to the 
lower back and pelvic region, which were painful 
incapacitating, but the prognosis as to when she 
would completely recover therefrom was uncer-
tain. 
* * * 
'' ... Without going further into detail as to 
plaintiff's complaints of pain, headache, loss of 
sleep, and nervousness, or the nature of the treat-
ment that she received from time to time, the evi-
dence in substance shows that she returned to 
work in the latter part of September, 1942; that 
thereafter she could not work continuously until 
September 1944, and that up to the trial she was 
at times forced to stop working because of pain 
in the back or head-aches. 
"There is evidence ... that plaintiff's actual 
. expenditures were somewhat in excess of $2,700 . 
. -· However, proof of loss due to her inability to work 
-is tenuous. What effect, if any, she may suffer in 
the future from her injuries, as testified to by her 
doctors, is uncertain. When these elements of 
. damages are fairly considered in connection with 
plaintiff's right to reasonable compensation for 
pain and suffering, it is clear to us that the award 
of $12,000 is clearly excessive. In our opinion the 
sum of $8,000 will fully compensate the plaintiff 
without injustice to the defendant.'' 
See also Corte v. St. Louis Pub. S.ervice Co., (Mo.), 
370 SW2d 29'7, where the court ordered a .reduction· _of_ a 
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verdict for $22,500 by the amount of $8500. In that case 
plaintiff had sustained a very severe head injury requir-
ing the boring of holes in his skull on both sides, and 
had incurred special damages, including loss of wages of 
approximately $3-500. 
CON'CL USION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence ad-
duced does not support the jury's findings in plaintiff's 
favor on the issue of liability; that the jury was not cor-
rectly instructed in the law; that the court erred in rul-
ings on evidence; that the award of damages is excessive, 
showing passion and prejudice; and that defendant is 
entitled to have the vedict set aside, and either to have 
judgment in its favor, or a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRIST'ENS·E·N AND JE·NS·E·N 
By RAY R. CHRIS·TENSEN 
Attorneys for defendarnt and appel-
lant. 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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